Abstract Can AI developers be held epistemically responsible for the processing of their AI systems when these systems are epistemically opaque? And can explainable AI (XAI) provide public…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their “capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007). One way to suffer epistemic injustice is to be subject to deficits of intelligibility. That is to be prevented from…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
The Spiritual Existential Threats Posed by AI, David Ellis and Jag Bhalla| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Abstract It has been argued that our currently most satisfactory social epistemology of science can’t account for science that is based on artificial intelligence (AI) because this social epistemology…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
In his review, Uwe Peters (2024) challenges my claim that we currently have no satisfactory social epistemology of AI-based science. He argues that the situation is not as dire as I take it to be…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
