Since the United States and Iran tacitly cooperated to defeat the challenge to Iraq’s integrity posed by the so-called Islamic State, the two powers have conducted a bare-knuckled competition to align Iraq with their respective interests| The Soufan Center
The incoming Biden administration will likely change U.S. Middle East policy marginally, not dramatically. The limitations of the Biden administration’s ability to alter policy are a function of the U.S. public’s increasing reticence to support U.S. military interventions or the expenditure of significant U.S. diplomatic and economic resources in the region| The Soufan Center
The June 18 rocket attack targeting the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was the fifth attack in a ten-day period targeting installations where U.S. forces and government personnel operate.| The Soufan Center
In discussions with European and other world leaders on February 18-19, President Biden and his foreign policy team formally welcomed the start of a diplomatic process to rejoin the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal that the Trump administration exited in May 2018| The Soufan Center
Since his inauguration in May, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has had an uneasy relationship with the several Shia militias that are formally part of the government’s ‘Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMUs), but in practice still report to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF)| The Soufan Center
Senior members of the Houthi family formed the ‘Ansar Allah’ (Partisans of God) movement in northern Yemen in 2004 as a rebellion against central authority, in line with their Zaydi Shia ideology against corruption and unjust rulership| The Soufan Center