Power-seeking theorems aim to formally demonstrate that artificial agents are likely to seek power in problematic ways. I argue that leading power-seeking theorems do not succeed.| Reflective altruism
Against the singularity hypothesis (Part 6: Implications)| Reflective altruism
This report examines what I see as the core argument for concern about existential risk from misaligned artificial intelligence. I proceed in two stages. First, I lay out a backdrop picture that informs such concern. On this picture, intelligent agency is an extremely powerful force, and creating agents much more intelligent than us is playing with fire -- especially given that if their objectives are problematic, such agents would plausibly have instrumental incentives to seek power over hum...| arXiv.org
Reward hacking -- where RL agents exploit gaps in misspecified reward functions -- has been widely observed, but not yet systematically studied. To understand how reward hacking arises, we construct four RL environments with misspecified rewards. We investigate reward hacking as a function of agent capabilities: model capacity, action space resolution, observation space noise, and training time. More capable agents often exploit reward misspecifications, achieving higher proxy reward and lowe...| arXiv.org
We study goal misgeneralization, a type of out-of-distribution generalization failure in reinforcement learning (RL). Goal misgeneralization failures occur when an RL agent retains its capabilities out-of-distribution yet pursues the wrong goal. For instance, an agent might continue to competently avoid obstacles, but navigate to the wrong place. In contrast, previous works have typically focused on capability generalization failures, where an agent fails to do anything sensible at test time....| arXiv.org
