Preface This is a follow-up thread for the already published rewards distribution architecture decision record. Today we present an on-chain design implementing the chosen options. Simple summary The Lido protocol upgrade that re-stakes newly appeared rewards after the Ethereum Merge will happen to achieve rewards compounding. Abstract We introduce the rewards distribution mechanism which consists of a dedicated vault contract acting as a coinbase (i.e. fee recipient) for the newly appeared...| Lido Governance
The purpose of this thread is to collect discussion and community alignment with regards to min-bid usage by Node Operators participating in in the Lido Protocol. As a start, I propose we begin the discussion based on Irina’s post from the relay voting proposal thread. In general I think that ~28-40% of blocks produced locally sounds about high but isn’t a prohibitive starting point, although a maximum APR decrease of 15% sounds high, given that it’s currently not easily discernable wha...| Lido Governance
Ethereum's roadmap is a lot to keep track of. This is your technical crash-course on everything from danksharding to KZGs to statelessness and so much more.| Delphi Digital
# MEV Monitoring Design Possible monitoring design in case of using MEV-boost for MEV extraction.| HackMD
Surely this undermines the basis of eth2 PoS consensus. How then does Ethereum secure itself against validators colluding to raise proposal rewards or even perform double spend attacks? Correct me if I’m wrong, but I imagine your answer will be that it is not in validator self-interest because of the threat to their stake from a loss of confidence in the network. What I want to show you is that the risks of full-block MEVA are comparable in severity, both in terms of gatekeeping centralizat...| Ethereum Research
An explanation of the proof-of-stake consensus protocol and its role in Ethereum.| ethereum.org
# State of research: increasing censorship resistance of transactions under proposer/builder separat| HackMD