As of late August, a number of indicators collectively suggest that the Trump administration no longer considers exercising preponderant influence in Iraq to be a top priority| The Soufan Center
In past U.S. presidential elections races, foreign policy issues, and Middle East policy in particular, were central to the U.S. debate. In 2020, the region has barely registered during the campaign season, with the possible exception of U.S. policy toward Iran| The Soufan Center
The military fight against the Islamic State has been exceedingly difficult and costly, especially to the Iraqi and Syrian forces that have fought the group for years, but also to civilians uprooted from their homes and forced to flee in order to survive.| The Soufan Center
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The January 3, 2020 U.S. strike that killed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qasem Soleimani and Abdul Mahdi Al Muhandis, the head of the main Iraqi surrogate for Iran, the Kata’ib Hezbollah (KAH) militia, was a major blow to Iran’s militia infrastructure in Iraq| The Soufan Center
The Trump administration continues to impose a steady stream of new U.S. sanctions and sanctions designations on Iran as part of its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign on that country| The Soufan Center