Like Foucault, I suspect that a new anthropology, a new form of mind, a new ‘episteme’ is taking shape, as the previous understandings of the human disappear, like figures written into the sand on a beach. In the codes of... Read More ›Source| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Abstract| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
According to moral encroachment, whether a doxastic attitude—such as a belief—is justified depends partly on moral considerations. For instance, if holding a belief involves a high risk of harm, one needs stronger evidence for that belief to be justified compared to situations where the moral stakes are low. In her article “In Defense of Robust Moral Encroachment” (2025), Alexandra Lloyd argues that, assuming that moral encroachment holds, we should adopt a robust version of this view...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective