No Epistemic Respect for Bullshit Machines or LLMs, Moti Mizrahi
Abstract| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Abstract| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Catherine Z. Elgin’s Epistemic Ecology (2025) presents a bold reconceptualization of epistemology that challenges the traditional spectatorial view of knowledge in favor of an agential…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
David W. Bates’s An Artificial History of Natural Intelligence enters at a moment when our understanding of the human is caught between two powerful but incompatible narratives. In the first…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
This essay attempts to comprehend how one might think about old masjids in Malabar using Martin Heidegger’s idea of “dwelling,” while also relating it to Talal Asad’s concept of “tradition,” and Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism. It is not, obviously, looking to a universal definition of masjids in Malabar. Rather, it is, in the most mundane sense, a thought exercise. Through his hermeneutic phenomenology, I use Heidegger’s philosophy to help me make sense of some of my t...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
We don’t need a paradigm shift. We need a revolution.— Nicole Bauer| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Like Foucault, I suspect that a new anthropology, a new form of mind, a new ‘episteme’ is taking shape, as the previous understandings of the human disappear, like figures written into the sand on a beach. In the codes of modern mystical experiences, I detect a future mentality attempting contact with our own hopelessly inadequate religious and rational forms of thinking. —Jeffrey J. Kripal, “Introductory Essay,” Rice University Department of Religion.| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Abstract| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
According to moral encroachment, whether a doxastic attitude—such as a belief—is justified depends partly on moral considerations. For instance, if holding a belief involves a high risk of harm, one needs stronger evidence for that belief to be justified compared to situations where the moral stakes are low. In her article “In Defense of Robust Moral Encroachment” (2025), Alexandra Lloyd argues that, assuming that moral encroachment holds, we should adopt a robust version of this view...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under normal circumstances knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each working on a more or less well-defined body of knowledge and each equipped with roughly the same imperfect cognitive capacities, albeit with varying degree of access to one another’s activities?| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
