It’s Hard to be Humble, Neil Levy| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Adam Green maintains that there is a need “for a virtue term that pertains to developing and maintaining a perspective that is epistemically independent of the groups to which one belongs” (Green 2024…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Sarah Wright’s essay, “Defending Autonomy as a Criterion for Epistemic Value” (2024), is a defense and suggested elaboration of Catherine Elgin’s work (cf. Elgin 2013). For Elgin, epistemic autonomy should be thought of, on analogy with Kantian autonomy generally, as a value and a constraint on a whole domain of human agency. Epistemic autonomy consists in believing for reasons one can reflectively endorse, and reflective endorsement requires recognizing the legitimacy of those reason...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
In a recent special issue of Social Epistemology (2024, 38:3), a diverse set of authors discuss epistemic autonomy,[1] its place as a virtue, and related uses and abuses of epistemic agency. In this response essay, I will develop a perspective on epistemic autonomy the importance of which is, I think, underlined by these essays taken as a set. The upshot of the essay being this. There is a need for a virtue term that pertains to developing and maintaining a perspective that is epistemically i...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Lisa Herzog’s wonderful book Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy (Herzog 2023), examines how democratic market societies should deal with the tension that can…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
