I sincerely appreciate Professor Levy’s continued engagement with my work. I’ll keep things short this time by offering direct responses to crucial passages in his reply (2024b). There are four of…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Blake Roeber and I are arguing at cross-purposes, and it’s at least partly my fault. He complains that my defence of the rationality of ordinary people, including their rationality when it comes to answering political questions (however we understand ‘political’), is irrelevant to his concern which is their reliability (Roeber 2024a). He points out that rationality doesn’t entail reliability. It’s plausible, however, that if we’re not reliable in the domain of politics, we can’t...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Blake Roeber’s new book (2024) is an impressive achievement. In just 150 or so pages of highly readable and accessible prose, Roeber argues for a novel view of how we should engage with politics in our highly polarized societies.[1] We should engage humbly, in full awareness of how little we can know. In this critical essay, I won’t take issue with Roeber’s prescriptions. Perhaps we should engage in politics humbly. I will, however, take issue with his arguments. I am sceptical of almos...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
I want to start by thanking Professor Levy for his illuminating discussion (2024) of my book. Levy is an excellent philosopher, who consistently notices things that other people miss, and it’s an honor to have him write about my work. … [please read below the rest of the article].| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Adam Green maintains that there is a need “for a virtue term that pertains to developing and maintaining a perspective that is epistemically independent of the groups to which one belongs” (Green 2024…| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Sarah Wright’s essay, “Defending Autonomy as a Criterion for Epistemic Value” (2024), is a defense and suggested elaboration of Catherine Elgin’s work (cf. Elgin 2013). For Elgin, epistemic autonomy should be thought of, on analogy with Kantian autonomy generally, as a value and a constraint on a whole domain of human agency. Epistemic autonomy consists in believing for reasons one can reflectively endorse, and reflective endorsement requires recognizing the legitimacy of those reason...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
In a recent special issue of Social Epistemology (2024, 38:3), a diverse set of authors discuss epistemic autonomy,[1] its place as a virtue, and related uses and abuses of epistemic agency. In this response essay, I will develop a perspective on epistemic autonomy the importance of which is, I think, underlined by these essays taken as a set. The upshot of the essay being this. There is a need for a virtue term that pertains to developing and maintaining a perspective that is epistemically i...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
