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不会或者不愿照顾别人才会忧虑被AI取代 | 银河铁道之夜

Tue, 07 Apr 2026 18:24:19 +0000

不会或者不愿照顾别人才会忧虑被AI取代

22 Mar, 2026

近期由于科研的原因和Effective Altruism圈有些交际。我对EA这个思潮的观感是，理论上没有问题，人当然是做有使命感的工作比只为了赚钱而干的工作更有干劲。

我为了移民把光辉的二十到三十岁职业期献给了富豪（Billionaire）们，工作的时候要假装把他们屁话当圣旨。唯一的慰藉是跟隔壁大学里读博的帅哥交流皮凯蒂，咒政府税死这帮人。其实这种阳奉阴违的状态和小时候在中国至少表面上要支（忍）持（受）中国共产党差不多，属于出于某种目的自发的精神分裂行为，是既累人又雷人的情感劳动。这种情感劳动非常伤害幸福感，是登顶马斯洛需求金字塔的最后障碍之一。

因此EA寻求为全球人类解决大问题的职业观在如今的美国社会非常合理。但EA的人怎么说呢，感觉有点邪教。我不是说和他们聊天不有趣或者人不好，就是有点神神叨叨的。尤其是对人工智能带来的未来有灾难化思维（catastrophizing）症状。

比如我前两天聊天的EA的一个人，他自顶校计算机专业毕业，很担忧 “AI变得很聪明以后我们这些程序员以后去干嘛啦？我们不就成无用之人了吗！？” 我现在对这些顶校男生们独特的忧愁方式也很熟了，他们对自己“聪明”的人设极其敝帚自珍。其实如果更注重健康的生活方式，多出门社交，就会发现只要出了他们自己的小圈子根本没几个人在乎别人聪明不聪明，大家还是比较在乎你是否比较好相处。这些男生还普遍有把个人对前途的忧虑包装成对家国天下担忧的倾向，可能是一种名为理性化（intellectualizing）的心理防御机制。不少人有抑郁症症状不去治，一个人在电脑前整天跟AI说话。动不动就把自己吓得不轻。

我自己对开挖掘机之类的蓝领工种神往多年，也没有顶校的聪明人设要维护，所以不怎么担心以后可能无法当程序员，反正当程序员只有拿到offer的时候会开心一下，真正干活的时候也没有特别开心。

前两天看到一项关于劳动市场的统计，那就是在美国护士已取代程序员成为了最快速增长的工种，医疗行业现已是美国最大雇主。所以我安慰他说不要担心啦，你发现没有，现在所有最贵，售价增长最快的商品仍然是来人的服务：医疗，教育，养老，育儿。是不是都贵到我们负担不起啊哈哈哈？这些行业对劳动供给仍然需求旺盛。

他居然真的没有注意到这些行业。单身无孩的tech bro们很容易这样，整天和其他tech bro混，就会忘记泡泡外面的世界。自己最擅长最引以为傲的技能，火热多年，可能突然有朝一日不再被市场需要。倒是以前都是男生不愿意选，女生去做的不那么光鲜的行业，异军突起，成为了最被需要，一时半会根本无法被AI取代的工种。

但我也能体会他的心情，我自己拼命地学习理工的原因之一也是不擅长也不愿意照顾别人。东亚文化很爱训练女性成为善于照顾人的人，这种文化让我从小就非常反感。人如果自发自愿地去照顾别人，做起来就不会产生怨气（resentment）。但如果是因为没有别的选择，而不得不走上为生存靠照顾别人的唯一道路，那就是整个社会对女性的胁迫（coercion）了。基督教文化对女性也有同样的压力。这样的文化背景加上中二的性格，导致我尤其不想做照顾人的工种，因为看起来就好像向文化屈服压力了一样，感觉超级丢脸。

就像当情绪劳动被专业化与市场化以后，以前因为各种各样原因被胁迫之人所做的劳动才体现了它们真正的价值。也正是因为养育儿童这种苦差事现在没有很多人愿意去做，所以老登们才整天难看地大声哭丧，还要到处取缔堕胎啊。

这场对话让我想起了一本去年读过的一本好书叫Of Boys and Men，台译《男性废退》。

作者Reeves有三个儿子，非常焦虑无数男性占多数工种被自动化的未来。以前制造业工人被机械取代，现在是工程师被软件取代，就连科研人员也受威胁。

对很多美国男人和男孩来说，那些照顾人的专业比如护理和咨询师，根本不在他们的雷达范围中。这其中有很多的文化缘由Reeves有详述，这些文化原因在我看来都非常愚蠢，就不引用了。我自己运动受伤被几个男性护士照顾过，心理咨询师也是男人，他们做得非常棒，非常专业。没有任何原因认为男性就做不好照顾人的工作。最新的数据也显示，在美国家庭中父母育儿的时间差别正逐年缩短，可能很快就会男女平分育儿工作了。

美式资本主义中，旧文化在新经济面前往往不堪一击，变迁速度非常快。大概因为旧文化和宗教再重要，也抵不过人要赚钱养家。大量年轻男性可以接受新经济现状，尝试学会照顾人，或者接受长期失业。我再遇到被AI取代的前景吓得半死的男同志们，就推荐这本书安慰他们，希望在EA圈里照顾别人成为一个堂堂正正的男子汉理想。在失业面前，人就不用痴迷于影响力规模（scale）不放了吧。

#书 #经济

U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Sat, 17 Jan 2026 19:37:03 +0000

In 2007, a strange financial crisis happened in the US and soon spreaded to every corner in the world. It is strange because unlike other recessions that happened before, it is not triggered by an event, such as external shocks or sudden policy adjustments. Nevertheless, the resulting economic recession was not any less than others, with a rippling effect that is probably longer than most.

The U.S. Housing market

House prices are constantly rising in major metropolitan areas in the US. The main reason is that people are experiencing unprecedented levels of mobility after World War II. The US, in particular, has attracted a steady infusion of immigrants with human capital from all over the world. There are only so many nice places in the US that are highly appreciated by home buyers, so homes in a good neighborhood are assets in scarcity; and the scarcity can only go up in time.

Since around 2001, after the tech bubble burst and the 9/11 terrorist attack, the US Fed has taken a drastic police reaction to stimulate the economy. The result was the interest rate was at an almost all-time low around 2004. The low mortgage rate further heated up the housing market and something called the subprime mortgage became very popular. A subprime mortgage is usually an ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) that has a very low introductory rate, that enables people who otherwise cannot afford to buy a house to buy one. Homebuyers wanted to take the risk because even if the homes turn out to be unaffordable in the long run, they can sell the houses for a profit then go back to renting. Well, only if home prices keep rising.

The low interest rate was only temporary as a short term policy to pull the economy out from the downturn. Starting from the lowest point in 2004, Fed was steadily raising the interest level back up. Many home buyers discovered that they really cannot afford the houses they got, so starting from 2007, foreclosure rates shot up, which put tremendous pressure on the house prices. Once house prices started falling, many new buyers with subprime mortgages realized that they have a negative asset in their houses so they became even more eager to foreclose their homes. The effect snowballed and by the middle of 2007, some major financial institutions were on the brink of bankruptcy. And this was merely the beginning.

At that time, the Fed still believed that “the housing market weakness did not appear to have spilled over to a significant extent.” Traditionally, the Fed has a line on the ground: inside the line there is commercial banking, which is heavily regulated. Outside the line are the investment bankers, which were not regulated nearly as much and took much more risks willingly for greater returns. The Fed believed that the firewalls on the line are strong enough so even if whatever outside the wall is burning, the inside shall survive largely intact.

The crisis

However, two factors effectively rendered this firewall null. One is the financial innovations such as CDOs that will easily spread credit risks across many financial institutions. The other is globalization, so foreign banks were also intimately connected to the US market and feel the subprime credit crunch just as much as the US banks. Effectively, everyone is on the same boat and if one goes down, so do everyone else.

Fed responded to the crisis in three ways:

Firstly, They used the traditional monetary and fiscal policy adjustments. Fed cut rate quickly, in fact, it was the fastest rate cutting in history. The US government also issued very large fiscal stimulus packages to stabilize the credit market.

Secondly, the Fed is directly involved in bailing out investment banks, such as Bear Steams, and underwrote a significant portion of the affected assets in the acquisition transactions. This was unprecedented in history.

Lastly, they strengthened the regulation on financial institutions in the areas such as information disclosure, liquidity management, and even attempted to regulate the investment banks. They also raised the loan limit of federal housing agencies.

The effects were controversial. We do not have enough information to judge those policies’ success because there was no counterfactual with which to compare. One thing we know for sure is: It was the actions or inactions of the Fed after the 2001 downturn that got us into this mess because there was no external shock to blame.

The aftermath

I am afraid history is repeating itself now:

An large external shock (COVID-19) that triggered a recession
Fed and the US government came up with very large and controversial policy reactions to stimulate the economy
Unregulated financial activities (private equities) at an all-time high
Financial innovations (crypto currencies) whose long term ramifications are unknown

Are we looking at a similar internal triggered recession a few years down the road?

Central Banks and Their Roles

Tue, 30 Dec 2025 09:54:00 +0000

Before the early 20th century, central banks’ responsibilities and thus their powers were rather limited. They were set up to issue currency, purchase government debt and facilitate inter-bank transactions. There were not many monetary policies to make; managing the macro economy was not their responsibility.

How the Fed comes into power

The widely held belief at that time was that the macro economy would correct itself by the force of the market. If the demand were weak, commodity prices would go down and bring back the consumption. If unemployment went up, the price for labor would decline and bring back the employment level. The nominal economy metrics, such as the GDP and the CPI should be uncoupled from the real outputs and consumption of the society as a whole.

However, the great depression in the early 20 century changed the prevailing view. People realized that the nominal economic factors really have a profound effect on the real economy factors. The market may not always be able to correct itself. Part of the reason is price rigidity. For example, if demand were low, firms may lower production instead of lowering price. Also if unemployment were high, people may still not be willing to work for a much lower wage. So if the equilibrium were out of whack due to some large shock to the economy, the market alone cannot recover the economy, at least not in a timely fashion. Some kind of coordinated intervention, such as policy change, is needed.

Thus the central banks, in particular the central bank (the Fed) of the United States took on a much bigger responsibility than before: To correct the market failures in the macro economy using monetary policies.The Fed has several levers, but they all boil down to interest rate manipulation. For example, if the inflation were high and the market cannot correct itself, the Fed will manipulate the interest rate to make it higher, so the firms are less likely to invest, thus bringing down the aggregated demand, and the price in the end. If unemployment were high, the Fed would lower the interest rate so firms have an easier access to capital so they can invest more and hire more people in the process, so unemployment would come down.

The Fed has two mandates, which are: one, controlling inflation, two, controlling the unemployment rate. The power to control the interest rate has great influence on the economy, so to prevent the power from being abused by the government for the agenda of the politicians, the Fed gained autonomy status from the government in the 1950s, so it can focus on it’s mandates without answering to the whim of public opinions or election cycles.

Fed’s dilemma

However, the tool the Fed has, the interest rate, while powerful, is only in a single dimension. On the other hand, the crisis of the economy can be very different in nature and contains many variables; so sometimes the Fed is in a dilemma: On one side they want to lower the interest rate to fight unemployment, while at the same time they need a higher interest rate to combat inflation, such as in the “stagnation” case of the 70’s. We also need to consider that manipulating the interest rate can also have many side effects, some of them not prominent until several years later. For example the sub-prime crisis was largely caused by a prolonged low interest rate period after the recession in the early 2000’s.

There is another important factor we need to consider. The chairman and governors of the Fed are only human; they could make mistakes, or worse, they could have their own agenda to push, their own gains to chase. How do we make sure the Fed will always act in the interest of the whole society? How do we gauge the performance of the Fed, and correct the “correcting acts” of the Fed if something went haywire?

I don’t pretend that I even have the faintest idea for the answers to those questions. I think the Fed alone, with the weapon of adjusting the interest rate, cannot handle the newer generation of recessions. On the other hand, we probably don’t want to empower the Fed even further so they become gods. I see that there are two great powers that affect the economy: the fiscal policy wielded by the government, and the monetary policy wielded by the Fed. I believe there needs to be yet another power, separated from both the government and the Fed, to make the system robust. I don’t know what the power is though.

China, the New Norm

Wed, 10 Sep 2025 07:34:43 +0000

Back in the late 1990’s, very few economists believed that within 20 years, China would grow to become the second latest economy in the world. Fast forward to nowadays, many economists believe that in another 20 years, China can overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world. Some policy makers in the United States even expressed that preventing China from overtaking the United States is the most important guiding factor in deciding the policies of the United States. How did China achieve phenomenal growth in the last 40 years? What should we expect from China in the next 20 years?

The rise of China

China was admitted into the WTO in 2001, 6 years after the formation of the multilateral trade organization, after 15 years of negotiations with the WTO, the earlier trade organizations and other countries, and 23 years since the dramatic change of direction (from exporting revolutions to exporting goods) in China’s policy. Riding on the wave of globalization, China quickly became the world’s factory as we know it today: Export tripled in a mere 2 years from 2001 to 2003, and tripled again in 4 years inß 2007. The main driving force behind China’s growth was the global demands of manufactured goods, particularly from the United States. China seized this opportunity not just by luck; the preparation has been 23 years in the making: A market driven economy that created a blooming private sector, an abundant and educated workforce that are willing to work for a very low wage in the western standard, and a better infrastructure compared to other developing countries. So it was China, not anyone else, that hit the jackpot.

After the first few golden years of China in the WTO, the leaders of China realized that there are a few structural problems created by this unprecedented growth: Deteriorating environment, growing social inequality, and above all, the demand from the external, primarily from the developed countries, would slow down someday soon. Evidently, China did not have to wait for long for the slowdown: The sub-prime crisis in the US happened in 2008. So the then prime minister Wen tried to devise some policies to level the income inequality within China and cultivate the internal demand as the second driving horse beside the exports. His policies had mixed successes; in 2010 the export over GDP ratio was lowered from the height of 35% down to 24%, which would be further reduced to 21% in 2014, while China can still attain 6%+ growth in GDP YoY over the period. On the other hand, the Gini index did not improve, and the pollution problem was worsening. Even more alarmingly, the debt level of the local government and the SOE were at all time high, with many debts being essentially unserviceable.

After Xi came into power, the search for new demand to drive growth went outwards again. In his One Belt One Road initiative, China is trying to cultivate demands for Chinese goods and services from the developing world, using state sponsored financial aids and private investment abroad as leverage. Again, I’d call the result of this policy shift a mixed success. On one hand, some demands have been created that fueled the growth of GDP in recent years. On the other hand, demonstrating the influence of China abroad became not just for the ego of Xi himself, but also a necessity. This influence, or “flex of muscle” if you wish, raised concerns from other countries, and put China in a clash course with the current dominant power of the world, the United States.

The conflicts

I do not believe the trade deficit is the main conflict between the US and China. There are at least 2 other conflicts that are even more profound: The tight control of capital flows across the border by the Chinese government, and the iron tight control of information censorship within China. In China’s view, controlling capital flow is a necessary self-defence because she has seen what a sudden outflow of foreign investment has done to some Latin America and Southeast Asia countries. However, the capital control created a deep untrust of the Chinese government, not just from the foreign entities, but also from Chinese firms and nationals themselves: Are my assets safe here?

Censorship is an even bigger problem. From the viewpoint of the Chinese government, there is a deep mistrust of foreign influence, because the legitimacy of the current form of government is very questionable, or at least unpopular. So they have to do everything in their power to “weed out” the dissent. However, from the US point of view, the number one competency of the US is the leadership in information technology, and the resulting dominance in media, both in traditional form and the newer social form. Now that the US firms are denied access to a market they are otherwise very favorable, it is unfair and immoral.

Even discounting the tension with the US and the West, censorship is stiffening innovation in China and is becoming a major detrimental factor for future productivity growth of China. I don’t know what will happen; It is likely that both the US and China will experience a prolonged period of stagnation in the foreseeable future, so their relationship may not matter that much. One thing I know: whatever happened in 2001 will not happen to China again, or to any country for that matter.

一种新的宏观调控手段

Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:54:31 +0000

我前一段研究了一阵子宏观经济学。目前由于种种原因，全球经济前景不容乐观. 纯市场手段已经不起作用，宏观调控手段从过去经验上来看，有不小的副作用. 那么，还有什么方法能让经济发展稳定下来，而不是滞胀，或者忽冷忽热呢？我有了一个大胆的想法。

目前的调控手段

目前的调控手段有两个，一个是财政手段，一个是金融政策手段。财政手段掌握在政府手中：政府可以根据社会总需求坚挺或疲软，逆向调节政府采购，从而给社会总需求削峰填谷。金融政策手段掌握在央行手里：央行可以根据经济是否过热或萧条来调节利率以及货币总供给，从而调节资本成本，加强或削弱投资积极性，从而给疲软的经济打强心针，给过热的经济吃退烧药。

财政手段粗看起来没有问题。问题在于，政府采购见效慢，从批复，到找相应的项目投资或减资，到影响到经济层面需要一个不短的过程。另外，政府削减开支阻力重重，谁想自己的部门预算降低呢？增加开支倒是人人乐意，但各国政府已经深陷赤字：美国上年度财政赤字超过 -16%, 日本稍好，只有 -12%，但日本政府总负债已经到了全国GDP的 266% 的骇人程度，再增加开支恐怕几辈子都还不上了。

金融政策见效快。利率动一动，整个市场就跟着动起来了。问题在于，央行降息增加的流动性很难流到真正需要钱的生产领域，大部分被金融机构截流，把各种资产，如股票或房产炒高了，对生产反而无益有害。央行如果想加息则基本没有空间。以日本为例，政府总负债已经到了全国GDP的 266%，加息就是自杀。所以，央行们常常是顾此失彼。以美国联储为例，又要平抑物价，又要增加就业。但平抑物价需要加息，增加就业需要减息。要是通胀和失业都高，就是所谓滞胀情况下，不管加息减息都两面不是人。欧洲央行稍微好点，只需平抑物价，就业是各国自己的事。结果就是欧盟内部失业率从荷兰的 3.3% 到西班牙的 13.65%啥水平都有，几家欢乐几家愁。还有一点不能不考虑，央行归根到底是银行家控制，他们不可避免地和私有领域的银行家有利益纠葛，不能认为是完全公正无私的。所以，央行权力过大不是好事。

宏观经济学上看各种经济指标，不外乎来自供给侧或者需求侧。财政手段明显是一个纯需求侧的调控手段。金融政策调节的是投资，也主要是一个需求侧的调控手段，对供给侧的影响是间接的。那么有没有供给侧的宏观调控手段呢？暂时还没有。

第三只脚

一个凳子至少要有三只脚才会稳。经济运行要调控，但目前只有以上这两种手段，靠政府和央行两个力量相互制约。这注定是一个不稳定的系统。所以，我想建立第三种力量，掌握第三种权力，这样应该能改善目前的不稳定局面。假如把央行手中增加就业的责任拿走，让它只需考虑平抑物价，类似欧洲央行一般，那么它应该可以把这件事做的很好。

问题是就业谁管？

在我的构想里，要成立一个非政府，非金融体系的民间非赢利机构，来负责调控就业。这是一个相当重的责任，所以相应地需要给这个组织有相应的，垄断性的权力才行。以下为行文方便，给这个假想的组织命名为全国总工会。

劳动币

全国总工会使用区块链技术发行一种数字加密货币，可以叫做劳动币。国家用法律规定，所有用工单位，发放工资奖金等劳动报酬，必须以劳动币形式发放。所有雇佣单位和打工人都在同一个区块链上开设劳动币账户，所有的劳动合同都必须以劳动币为单位。劳动币和主权货币自由兑换。

Labourcoin

劳动币是以主权货币百分之百抵押发行的，在链上账户不仅没有利息，还有保管费用。而且，再大的庄家也大不过全国总工会，所以，恶意的投机事件不会存在，劳动币的波动性会很小。频繁的卖高买低会普遍存在，导致劳动币流通迅速，价格透明。

劳动币所有交易在区块链上存底，所有第三方都可以自行验证。打工人的数字钱包代码自己掌握，从而保护个人隐私。个人收入所得税填报以及社会福利账户也可以与此关联，简化手续，降低欺诈风险。

如果失业率过高，则劳动币需求降低。自然而然的劳动币贬值，相当于全国劳动者一起降薪。企业成本降低，利润上升，会更有积极性雇人。反之，假如用工需求过于旺盛，则劳动币升值，相当于全国劳动者一起加薪。企业成本上升，利润降低，会少雇人，从而降低劳动币需求。

全国总工会作为劳动币的庄家，可以在市场上因势利导，调控劳动市场和失业率。对劳动币它可以收取保管费，交易手续费，以及劳动币借贷服务。它收取的费用可以覆盖它的运作以及劳动币区块链的主节点运行费用。

劳动币作为一种宏观调控手段，它的最大好处是直接作用到供给侧，也就是用工单位的成本上。所以，它可以和需求侧的调控手段如财政手段或金融政策手段有效互补。而且，全国总工会作为非政府机构，可以和政府和央行三者一起形成三角权力制约，防止一家独大。

总结

发行劳动币的实际操作恐怕困难重重：难点不在技术上，而在于现在掌握权力的人或者机构是很难愿意分享权力的。所以，以上只是我作为一个经济学业余爱好者的一点天方夜谭式的臆想罢了。

American Inequality and Globalization

Fri, 29 Aug 2025 09:57:40 +0000

The United States is the first and the biggest modern democracy in this world. However, it also has a rather dark history of inequality that has its root in slavery. Things have gotten much better in the recent decades, but the situation is still not quite what we would like it to be, despite all the legislation reforms and affirmative actions. The black community is still suffering from lower income, higher crime rate, lower education and poor health care. All of these are unjust.

American Inequality

After the civil war and the abolition of the slavery in the south, the US envolved into a kind of caste system for a social hierarchy: The old white, or the WASP (white, anglo-saxon protestant) at the top, the new whites (later immigrants from the Europe) at the middle, and the blacks (freed slaves and their decendants) at the bottom. Over the next few decades til the 1960s, the integration between the old whites and the new whites had gone very well; while the integration between the whites and the blacks was negligible in comparison. Many policies, such as the policies on housing, financing, education, all the way to the right to vote were heavily unfavorable to the blacks. In essence, the old whites, by sharing power and joining with the new whites, successfully built a system that suppressed and exploited the blacks to strengthen their dominance, despite being few in numbers.

After the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the intentional suppression largely ceased to exist. However, subconscious and subtle prejudices are much harder to get rid of. The concentration of police brutality on the blacks is a prime example. As a newcomer to the United States, I can’t help but notice that the demographic taxonomy of blacks/whites using the one-drop rule, which we still use today, is based on racial prejudice and nothing else. The United States has come a long way; yet there is still so much longer to go.

The cause of inequality between black and white Americans is rooted in human nature. The ones with power and privilege would like to keep their power and privilege, consciously or subconsciously. So some level of inequality will always be there in society. What makes American inequality especially bad is that this inequality is based on an external attribute, the color of the skin, that one cannot change, thus inhibiting social mobility. The inequality in opportunity is the worst kind of inequality because it perpetuates itself.

Global Inequality

The inequality in the world is but a larger version of the same thing in the US. Likewise, it was always there. Before globalization, the world was segregated into several smaller worlds, just like the black/white segregation in the earlier US. The developed countries (Europe and North America) have too few people to perpetuate their dominance status, so naturally they need allies that have ambition to move up the hierarchy and are willing to suck up to them. In the last few decades of globalization they found their allies in Asia. However, the door is closing to all the laggard countries, such as sub-Saharan Africa, because the world can’t afford for everyone to be rich.

Just like the inequality in the US, the inequality in income across countries is only the symptom of the deeper inequality in opportunity, which is based on an external attribute, which is political alliance during a brief period of time (the last years of the cold war). So although globalization reduced some inequality, such as extreme poverty, it also enlarged inequality in other areas, such as the internal inequality in the US and China. It does not cost the ones in power much to pull some people out of extreme poverty and it also looks nice on them; however, the system is almost as unfair as before.

What can we do

I believe the inequality in opportunity is fundamentally wrong; it will cause stagnation in development in human civilization; and even the ones who are better off now will suffer in the long run. However, we humans are notoriously short sighted; so I don’t think equality can be granted by the privileged from top down. It is up to the underprivileged people to rise up, to demand equal opportunity everywhere, not afraid of putting themselves on the line. The civil right movement in the 1960s was a very good example of this.

On the other hand, the business leaders are not in possession of the power to cure inequality, nor do they have the responsibility of doing so. They can see the inequality as an opportunity for arbitrage, such as outsourcing to countries with cheaper labor, etc. If the market is healthy, the invisible hand should play in favor of reducing inequality. If the market is not healthy, whatever the business leaders can do at the individual level does not matter, or worse.

China FAQ 常见中国问题解答系列 – Isn’t China the world’s sweatshop? 难道中国不是世界血汗工厂吗？ | Chuang

Thu, 14 Dec 2023 18:02:20 +0000

中文版见本页底部

For the fifth part in our series of short communist responses to common questions about China, we respond to questions such as “Isn’t China full of sweatshops? Aren’t Chinese workers basically like slaves making clothes and iPhones for Western consumers?”

As always, we encourage readers to reformat these answers for use across platforms. If you’ve designed pamphlets or infographics using these materials, please send them to us (e-mail: chuangcn@riseup.net) so that we can archive them here and repost on social media!

As with any other country, there are certainly factories with sweatshop conditions in China. But the motorcycle delivery driver and the burned-out office worker are more representative of Chinese employment today than a migrant worker on an assembly line making shoes or electronics for export. Sweatshop work is rightly abhorred for deplorable conditions, low pay, and long hours, but these features aren’t unique to factory work, nor is manufacturing the major site of worker resistance in China. Manufacturing played a bigger role in China’s economy a decade or two ago, in terms of employment and output. This is the period that most of our images of Chinese “sweatshops” come from, since it was the time when much of the world’s most labor-intensive manufacturing work was concentrated in the country. Today, however, Chinese manufacturing has grown more automated, and many of the most labor-intensive occupations are being relocated to poorer countries (for example: textile factories moving to Cambodia and Bangladesh, or low-end electronics assembly to Vietnam), meaning that industry continues to be a major source of economic output for China (as it is for all “postindustrial” countries) even as the country “deindustrializes” in the sense that a smaller share of overall employment is involved in manufacturing. This is a general pattern in capitalist development, reproduced again and again in different times and places.

But if this is something that has happened in other countries before, then why do we tend to associate images of sweatshop manufacturing with China? The first and most obvious reason is simply because a lot of the world’s low-end manufactured goods were, for about twenty years, “made in China.” This is beginning to change (just take a look at the tags on your clothing, likely made somewhere else) and it’s likely that we’ll begin to associate these images more with South and Southeast Asia in the near future, just as it was once common to associate the same images with tags reading “made in Mexico” or “made in Taiwan.” On the other hand, there is a second important reason that this image is so salient: The idea that Chinese workers are “iSlaves” dying to make your iPhone is also the result of years of propaganda by the NGO industrial complex, designed primarily to guilt consumers in the US or Germany and to shame Apple and its suppliers into more “ethical” production chains. The anti-sweatshop movement in the wealthy countries emerged as a poor substitute for organizing workers at the point of production, since offshoring had effectively undercut the power of existing unions. The ultimate impact of the movement on labor conditions has been negligible. Instead, it has mostly served as a way to recruit idealistic college students into institutional politics via non-profit activism.

There’s no ambiguity about the brutal labor practices that still prevail in the electronics assembly sector, which still employs millions of workers in China. The iPhone production chain became a topic of attention, in part, because there was a spate of worker suicides at the Shenzhen production plant where the phones were produced. But the reality is that work kills, in every country, and across many industries. The construction industry is far more deadly than manufacturing, and simply by reading Chinese news one can find reports of parcel or food delivery worker deaths at least once a month in recent years.^[1] The image of the Chinese sweatshop entered the imagination of people in the wealthy countries because it was a convenient target for consumer politics campaigns. These campaigns are common in rich countries because they play on people’s “first world” guilt, invoke orientalist fantasies about a brainwashed or helpless Asian populace, and are also relatively toothless—even helping to rebrand the monopoly corporations of the rich countries as “ethical” by comparison. But there is no substantial difference in the degree of enslavement between Chinese workers making iPhones, European warehouse workers at Amazon, and the immigrant workers in American meatpacking plants.

Many of those who believe China is full of sweatshops also tend to believe other outdated and inaccurate portrayals of China and its dynamics of class struggle. Some believe, for example, that workers in sweatshops, or factory workers in general, are the leading class fraction of China’s proletariat (or even that “proletariat” = factory workers), and that developing a “labor movement,” rooted in this fraction, is the key to any progressive or revolutionary change. This view is common among a wide range of people inside and outside China, from enthusiastic left-wing activists to academics studying labor relations, or NGOs like China Labor Bulletin. For decades, they expected that factory strikes in the Pearl River Delta might turn into a wave of unionization, enable collective bargaining with employers, or even produce independent left-wing labor parties. But these things never came to pass and the “labor movement” in China died before it was born. In reality, there is no single “leading fraction” of the working class as a whole or within China. The basic idea here is chauvinistic, rejecting the struggles of certain proletarians in favor of “proper” struggles that fit a pre-determined ideological schema that bears little relationship to reality. The labor movement perspective has always obscured the full spectrum of the real, changing cadence of class struggle in China. Reliable and comprehensive data on social protests can be hard to come by, but we have done our best to illustrate what we do know in our articles “No Way Forward, No Way Back” and “Picking Quarrels,” in issues 1 and 2 of the Chuang journal (2016 and 2019).

More careful analysis of the actual data shows that not only is the employment structure of China shifting away from labor-intensive factory work toward a more nebulous array of services and higher-tech production, but also that protests and social struggles are shifting away from the patterns of the 2000s and early 2010s, which had been defined by rural protests against state appropriation of land and labor struggles in the cities. Labor actions in manufacturing have fallen precipitously as a portion of all labor actions, according to Wickedonna data and other records of labor struggles such as China Labor Bulletin. At the same time, other forms of social unrest, like protests over housing by more affluent social strata, are growing, and have often outnumbered labor disputes in recent years. Meanwhile, the forms taken by class struggle have diversified. The introduction of flexible employment contracts and various forms of “gig” labor have worsened precarity and intensified working hours across a wide range of sectors, bringing new issues to the forefront of struggles.

As we state in our summary of these dynamics in “Picking Quarrels”:

Rather than coalescing under an affirmative “worker” identity, subjectivities of a different kind are forming in relation to the present structure of the Chinese economy. A communist prospect, if possible at all, must be collectively constructed, rather than imported from insular activist or academic circles. Moreover, it must stretch across deeply fractured segments of the proletariat despite their conflicting interests, and today seems unable to rely on a single, hegemonic subject said to represent the interests of the class as a whole, as the mass industrial worker did (briefly and with questionable results) for the labor movement of old. If this communist horizon arrives, it will almost certainly take on a form initially alien to our expectations, adapting pre-existing identities in unpredictable and even unpalatable ways.

These trends in unrest are also a reflection of changes in China’s job structure, which in the near future is going to look more and more like those of “more developed,” “postindustrial” countries—many of which are still major producers of the world’s industrial goods, even though they are no longer major employers of the world’s industrial workers. Shit jobs in the service industry already dominate the economy, and employment is becoming increasingly precarious and low-paid, amid rising costs. China’s job structure is becoming more dependent on the service sector and moving away from agriculture, mining, manufacturing and construction. As in wealthier countries, the labor market in major Chinese cities is also bifurcating, with a majority of residents employed in lower-paying, lower-skill services and logistics work, and a minority employed in higher-paying, higher-skill jobs.

This doesn’t mean that everything about our image of the “sweatshop” is wrong. Ideas about Chinese sweatshops have their roots in the real economic developments of the 1990s and 2000s. Jobs in the manufacturing sector grew dramatically in the years after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Foreign manufacturers poured into coastal regions, drawing people out of the agricultural sector and into manufacturing, alongside industries like construction. Many of the first major labor strikes and protests in the manufacturing sector were indeed against sweatshop conditions such as unsanitary canteen food, low wages, and military style management. The worst conditions were found in the most labor-intensive sectors such as textiles. Again, though: none of this was unique to China. Similar sweatshops had operated (and often continue to operate) in earlier garment production hubs, even within the wealthy countries. Over the course of the 2000s, however, the phasing out of the “Multi Fibre Arrangement” (MFA), which had mandated quotas that limited the amount of garment exports to wealthy countries, ultimately saw garment production even more heavily concentrated, with China winning out over most other competitors. This confluence of factors ensured that Chinese industrial zones would become the face of “sweatshop” labor for much of the world.

But after a decade of mass migration into coastal production zones, labor costs began to rise. When this happens, employers are faced with two choices: technological upgrading to increase productivity, or relocation to sources of cheaper labor. Both of these trends began to accelerate in China over the course of the 2010s. The expansion of manufacturing jobs peaked in the first years of the decade and has since declined (both in terms of the total number of workers in the sector and as a share of total employment). This was matched by a smaller decline in manufacturing’s share of total economic output: From 2010 to 2019, the sector’s contribution to GDP dropped from 31.61% to 27.17%. At the same time, many of the more labor-intensive industries, with stereotypically “sweatshop” conditions, either moved out of China or deeper into the Chinese interior where labor and land are cheaper, environmental regulations more lax, and local governments more willing to subsidize industrial capital. Other industries took a different route, making expensive technological upgrades and shedding workers as they entered into more high-end production lines. For a more comprehensive illustration of the industrial development of China in the late 20^th and early 21^st centuries, see our data briefs: “The Changing Geography of Chinese Industry,” and “Measuring the Profitability of Chinese Industry.”

These very broad statistics understate just how dramatically the structures have changed for working people in China, and how far employment has moved away from “sweatshop” manufacturing toward precarious service jobs. According to the latest migrant worker surveys, jobs in manufacturing, while decreasing in number each year, have also seen both the highest pay compared to other sectors and the highest growth in pay rates. In contrast, the service sector, which now employs the most people, also has the lowest wages and the slowest rates of wage growth. Wages for migrant workers grew fastest in manufacturing, at a rate of 3.5 percent, while service sector jobs in sales or food service grew at 1.7 and 2.1 percent respectively.

And in terms of labor time, of course stereotypes about sweatshop workers conjure up images of grueling hours performing monotonous tasks on assembly lines. While workers in manufacturing surely work long hours, those in service jobs work by far the longest, in a country where working hours are reaching unprecedented levels. And whereas it was common ten or twenty years ago for migrant workers in construction and manufacturing to die from exhaustion or overwork, nowadays it is more common to hear about such incidents occurring in the tech industries. The lengthening of the working day is one of the primary forces behind internet buzzwords like “lying flat” (tangping 躺平), or the “996” system where employers expect employees to work from 9am to 9pm six days a week.

China’s own National Bureau of Statistics data show a clear increase in working time over the years, according to surveys on average weekly working hours for all employed persons. The hours climbed steadily in the 2000s, in the years following China’s accession to the WTO, reaching an initial peak in 2005. They dipped during the global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath of 2008-2009, and then began climbing again, first gradually then more steeply in recent years. The bureau began releasing figures on a monthly basis in late 2019, which showed that weekly working hours hit their highest figure on record in October of 2021, when China’s economy had flown into overdrive during a brief surge. Other data tell a similar story and show that the slow and steady increase in labor hours has been developing for some time. The 2017 China Time Use Survey published a follow-up report on the nation’s first ever time-use study, performed by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2008. These findings showed that the proportion of workers doing overtime increased from 12 percent of the working population to 42 percent. The survey also showed that China has longer working hours than any other country with comparable data, with the exception of Colombia, and longer working hours than any OECD country, with the exception of Turkey.

In sum, China is not defined by sweatshops, nor are its proletarian struggles – in fact, its class composition and struggles are increasingly similar to those in other “more developed” countries. To understand this, we have to overcome many of the tropes portraying China as being fundamentally different, so we can together realize our common fate and better support one another in our common struggle.

^[1] There are no detailed official statistics on worker deaths in logistics, or manufacturing for that matter. However, Chinese news reports regularly cover work related accidents, horrific injuries, and deaths. Projects like China Labour Bulletin’s Workplace Accident Map has records hundreds of major workplace accidents per year, involving worker deaths or multiple workers injured. In 2019, before the pandemic and under more “normal” conditions for delivery drivers, CLB recorded 15 delivery driver deaths.

难道中国不是世界血汗工厂吗？ —— 常见中国问题解答系列

在我们共产主义对有关中国的常见问题的简短回应系列的第五部分中，我们回答诸如这些的问题：“中国不是到处都是血汗工厂吗？中国工人基本上不就是为西方消费者缝衣服、造iPhone的奴隶吗？”

和以往一样，我们鼓励读者用其他格式把这些回答转发到各个平台。如果您利用这些材料设计了小册子或者信息图表，请发送一份给我们（邮箱：chuangcn@riseup.net），这样我们就可以留个存档，并且在社交媒体转发！

与今天的任何其他国家一样，中国当然存在条件如血汗工厂的工作场所。但相比起流水线上生产供出口的鞋子或电子产品的农民工，电动车上的外卖骑手和疲惫不堪的上班族更能代表当今中国的就业情况。血汗工厂的工作因恶劣的条件、低工资和长时间的工作而受到憎恶理所应当，但这些特征并非工厂工作所独有，制造业也不是中国工人反抗的主要地点。依据就业和产出的情况而言，制造业在一二十年前在中国经济中发挥了更大的作用，而正是这个时期里形成了大部分我们对中国“血汗工厂”的印象，因为当时世界上大部分劳动密集型的制造业工作都集中在中国。然而，今天，中国制造业已经变得更加自动化，许多劳动密集型特征最强的工作岗位正在转移到更贫穷的国家（例如：纺织厂转移到柬埔寨和孟加拉国、低端电子组装生产线转移到越南等），这意味着即使中国正在“去工业化”（制造业占总就业的比例在减少），工业仍然是中国经济产出的主要来源（对于所有“后工业化”国家也是如此）。这是资本主义发展的一般形态，在不同的时代和地点被反复再生产。

但如果这个过程在其他国家已经发生过，那为什么我们会倾向于将血汗工厂制造业的形象与中国联系起来呢？第一个也是最明显的直观原因，不过是世界上许多低端制成品在大约二十年的时间里都是“中国制造”。这种情况开始发生变化（看看你衣服上的标签，很可能是别处制作的），在不久的将来，我们很可能会开始将血汗工厂这个印象更多地与南亚和东南亚联系起来，就像以前一样人们通常会将相同的印象与写着“墨西哥制造”或“台湾制造”的标签联系起来。另一方面，这个形象如此显著还有第二个重要原因：这种“中国工人作为“i奴隶”正在拼死命地制造着你的 iPhone”的印象，也是非政府组织工业联合体多年宣传的结果，主要对象是美国或德国心中有愧的消费者，同时让苹果及其供应商羞愧难当，不得不采用更“道德”的生产链。富裕国家的反血汗工厂运动成为在生产节点组织工人的拙劣替代品，因为离岸外包实际上削弱了现有工会的力量。该运动对劳动条件的最终影响微不足道。相反，它主要成为一种招募方式，怀有理想主义的大学生借此通过非营利行动主义进入体制内政治。

毫无疑问，在中国仍然雇用上百万工人的电子组装部门里，残酷的用工情况仍然盛行。 iPhone生产链成为关注的话题，部分原因是生产手机的深圳工厂发生了多起工人自杀事件。但现实是——工作会杀人，这在每个国家、在许多行业均是如此。建筑业的死亡率远高于制造业，并且单看中国新闻，近几年就能至少每月一次发现快递员或外卖骑手死亡的报道。[1]中国血汗工厂的形象进入了富裕国家人们的想象，因为它是消费者政治运动的一个方便的目标。这些运动在富裕国家很常见，因为它们利用了人们对“第一世界”的愧疚感，唤起了关于被洗脑或无助的亚洲民众的东方主义幻想，而且这些运动相对没胆量——甚至通过不同地方的用工情况对比，为富裕国家的垄断公司重塑“道德的”形象。但制造 iPhone 的中国工人、欧洲亚马逊的仓库工人和美国肉类加工厂的移民工人之间的奴役程度并没有实质性差异。

许多认为中国充斥着血汗工厂的人也倾向于相信其他对中国及其阶级斗争动态的过时和不准确的描述。例如，一些人认为，血汗工厂的工人，或者工厂工人总体，是中国无产阶级的领导阶级部分（甚至“无产阶级”=工厂工人），并且相信将植根于这个部分的“工人运动”发展起来，是任何进步或革命性变革的关键。这种观点在中国国内外的人群中广泛存在，从热情的左翼活动家到研究劳资关系的学者、到像中国劳工通讯这样的非政府组织。几十年来，他们预计珠三角的工厂罢工可能会转变成一个工会化浪潮，让与雇主进行集体谈判、甚至产生独立的左翼工党也成为可能。但这些一直没有发生，中国的“工人运动”未生先死。实际上，无论是在整个工人阶级中还是在中国内部，都没有单一的工人阶级“领导部分”。这里的基本思想是沙文主义的，拒绝某些无产者的斗争，支持那些契合了预定的、与现实几乎没有关系的意识形态框架的“正当”斗争。这种工人运动的视角总是掩盖了中国阶级斗争真实的、不断变化的节奏的全貌。关于社会抗议的可靠和全面的数据常常很难获得，但我们已尽最大努力在第 1 、 2 期Chuang 杂志（2016 年和 2019 年）的文章“前不能进，后无退路”和“寻衅滋事”中阐述我们所知。

对实际数据更仔细的分析表明，不仅中国的就业结构正在从劳动密集型工厂工作转向更无定型的服务业和高科技生产，而且抗议和社会斗争模式也正从2000 年代和 2010 年代初的农村抗议国家征用土地和城市的劳工斗争模式中发生转变。根据 Wickedonna 的数据和中国劳工通讯等平台对劳工斗争的记录，制造业的劳工行动在所有劳工行动中的占比断崖式下降。与此同时，其他形式的社会动荡正在增加，如较富裕社会阶层对住房的抗议，而且近年来数量往往超过劳资纠纷。同时，阶级斗争的形式也多样化了。引入灵活雇佣合同和各种“零工”劳动形式后，工作变得更不稳定，大量部门的工时变长，为斗争前线带来新的问题。

正如我们在“寻衅滋事”中对这些动态的总结中所述：

肯定性的“工人”身份并没有聚合不同的主体性，恰恰相反，另一种与当前中国经济结构相关的主体性正在形成。共产主义的前景，要是有可能实现的话，必须集体构建，而不是从孤立的活动家或学术圈子引进。此外，尽管无产阶级深刻分裂的部分之间存在利益冲突，但该前景必须跨越这些裂痕，而今天似乎无法再像大众产业工人在旧工人运动里所做的那样（过程简短且结果存疑），依赖一个所谓代表整个阶级的利益的单一霸权主体。如果这种共产主义前景到来，它几乎肯定会具备一种起初与我们预期迥异的形式，并且以不可预测甚至令人不快的方式改造先前存在的身份。

动荡的这些趋势也反映了中国岗位结构的变化，在不久的将来，中国的岗位结构将越来越像“更发达”、“后工业化”国家——其中许多仍是世界上主要的工业品生产国，尽管它们不再是世界产业工人的主要雇主。服务业的狗屁工作已经主导了经济，在成本上升的情况下，就业变得越来越不稳定和低薪。中国的岗位结构越来越依赖于服务业，并逐渐远离农业、采矿业、制造业和建筑业。与较富裕的国家一样，中国主要城市的劳动力市场也在分化，大部分居民从事低薪、低技能的服务和物流工作，少数人从事高薪、高技能的工作。

这并不意味着我们关于“血汗工厂”形象的一切都是错误的。关于中国血汗工厂的想法源于 1990 年代和 2000 年代的实际经济发展。在中国于 2001 年加入世界贸易组织后的几年里，制造业部门的工作岗位急剧增加。外国制造商涌入沿海地区，将人们从农业部门吸引到制造业以及建筑等行业。制造业部门的许多第一次大规模罢工和抗议确实是针对血汗工厂的条件，例如不卫生的食堂食品、低工资和军事式管理。最糟糕的情况出现在纺织业等劳动密集型程度最高的部门。不过，重申一遍：这一切都不是中国独有的。类似的血汗工厂曾在早期的服装生产中心运营（并且经常继续运营），甚至在富裕国家内也是如此。然而，在 2000 年代，随着强制配额，限制向富裕国家的服装出口量的“多种纤维协议”(MFA) 被逐步取消，服装生产最终更加集中，而中国成功超越大多数其他竞争对手。这些因素的结合确保了中国工业区将成为世界大部分地区“血汗工厂”劳动力的面貌。

但在人口大规模迁移到沿海生产区之后的十年后，劳动力成本开始上升。发生这种情况时，雇主面临两种选择：通过技术升级以提高生产率，或搬迁至廉价劳动力的产地。这两种趋势在 2010 年代都开始在中国加速发展。制造业工作岗位的扩张在这十年的头几年触顶峰，此后已开始下降（既包括制造业的工人总数，也包括制造业占总就业人数的比例）。同样，制造业在经济总产出中所占份额也有小幅下降：从 2010 年到 2019 年，该部门对 GDP 的贡献从 31.61% 下降到 27.17%。与此同时，许多具有刻板印象里“血汗工厂”条件的劳动密集型产业要么迁出了中国，要么深入中国中腹，那里的劳动力和土地更便宜，环境法规更宽松，地方政府更愿意补贴产业资本。其他产业采取了不同的路线，在进入更高端的生产线时进行了昂贵的技术升级和裁员。有关 20 世纪末和 21 世纪初中国产业发展的更全面说明，请参阅我们的数据简介：“中国工业的地理变迁”和“衡量中国工业的盈利能力”。

这些非常宽泛的统计数据显现不出中国劳动人口的结构发生变化有多惊人，从“血汗工厂”制造业转向不稳定的服务业工作的程度有多高。根据最新的农民工调查，制造业的就业人数虽然逐年减少，但与其他行业相比，薪酬和薪酬增长率都是最高。相比之下，目前就业人数最多的服务业的工资最低，工资增长速度也最慢。农民工的工资增长最快的是制造业，增长率为 3.5%，而服务业的销售岗位或食品服务岗位分别增长 1.7% 和 2.1%。

至于劳动时间，关于血汗工厂工人的刻板印象当然会让人联想到在流水线上执行单调任务的艰苦时间。虽然制造业工人的工作时间当然很长，但在一个工作时间达到前所未有水平的国家，服务业工人的工作时间是目前最长的。一二十年前，建筑业和制造业的农民工因劳累或过度劳累而死亡很常见，而如今，更多听说此类事件在科技行业更容易听说。延长工作日是“躺平”或“996”制度（雇主希望员工每周工作六天，从早上 9 点工作到晚上 9 点）等互联网流行语背后的主要推动力之一。

根据中国自己的国家统计局多项关于所有就业人员平均每周工时的调查，多年来工作时间明显上升。在 2000 年代，在中国加入世贸组织后的几年里，工作时数稳步攀升，并在 2005 年达到了初步峰值。在2008–

2009 年全球金融危机及其后续期间有所下降，然后又开始攀升，先是逐渐上升，近几年更为陡峭。该局于 2019 年底开始按月发布数据，显示每周工作时间在 2021 年 10 月创下历史最高记录，当时中国经济正处于在短暂的飙升期中过速运载。其他数据也讲述了类似的趋势，表明劳动时间缓慢而稳定的增长已经发展了一段时间。 2017 年“中国时间利用调查”为国家统计局2008 年首次进行的全国时间使用研究提供了后续报告。这些调查结果表明，加班工人占工作人口的比例从 12% 增加到 42%。调查还显示，中国的工作时间比哥伦比亚以外的任何其他有可比数据的国家都长，也比土耳其以外的任何经济合作与发展组织。

总之，中国不是由血汗工厂定义的，它的无产阶级斗争也不是——事实上，它的阶级构成和斗争与其他“更发达”国家越来越相似。要理解这一点，我们必须克服许多将中国描绘成根本不同的陈腔滥调，这样我们才能一起意识到我们共同的命运，并在我们的共同斗争中更好地相互支持。

[1] 没有关于物流或制造业工人死亡的详细官方统计数据。然而，中国的新闻报道经常报道与工作有关的事故、重大的伤害和死亡情况。中国劳工通讯的工作场所事故地图等项目每年记录数百起重大工作场所事故，每一起涉及工人死亡或多名工人受伤。 2019 年，在疫情前送货司机工作条件更“正常”的情况下，中国劳工通讯记录了 15 名送货骑手死亡。

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