Roastidio.us Tagged with 经济

American Inequality and Globalization

Tue, 13 Oct 2026 22:19:12 +0000

The United States is the first and the biggest modern democracy in this world. However, it also has a rather dark history of inequality that has its root in slavery. Things have gotten much better in the recent decades, but the situation is still not quite what we would like it to be, despite all the legislation reforms and affirmative actions. The black community is still suffering from lower income, higher crime rate, lower education and poor health care. All of these are unjust.

American Inequality

After the civil war and the abolition of the slavery in the south, the US envolved into a kind of caste system for a social hierarchy: The old white, or the WASP (white, anglo-saxon protestant) at the top, the new whites (later immigrants from the Europe) at the middle, and the blacks (freed slaves and their decendants) at the bottom. Over the next few decades til the 1960s, the integration between the old whites and the new whites had gone very well; while the integration between the whites and the blacks was negligible in comparison. Many policies, such as the policies on housing, financing, education, all the way to the right to vote were heavily unfavorable to the blacks. In essence, the old whites, by sharing power and joining with the new whites, successfully built a system that suppressed and exploited the blacks to strengthen their dominance, despite being few in numbers.

After the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the intentional suppression largely ceased to exist. However, subconscious and subtle prejudices are much harder to get rid of. The concentration of police brutality on the blacks is a prime example. As a newcomer to the United States, I can’t help but notice that the demographic taxonomy of blacks/whites using the one-drop rule, which we still use today, is based on racial prejudice and nothing else. The United States has come a long way; yet there is still so much longer to go.

The cause of inequality between black and white Americans is rooted in human nature. The ones with power and privilege would like to keep their power and privilege, consciously or subconsciously. So some level of inequality will always be there in society. What makes American inequality especially bad is that this inequality is based on an external attribute, the color of the skin, that one cannot change, thus inhibiting social mobility. The inequality in opportunity is the worst kind of inequality because it perpetuates itself.

Global Inequality

The inequality in the world is but a larger version of the same thing in the US. Likewise, it was always there. Before globalization, the world was segregated into several smaller worlds, just like the black/white segregation in the earlier US. The developed countries (Europe and North America) have too few people to perpetuate their dominance status, so naturally they need allies that have ambition to move up the hierarchy and are willing to suck up to them. In the last few decades of globalization they found their allies in Asia. However, the door is closing to all the laggard countries, such as sub-Saharan Africa, because the world can’t afford for everyone to be rich.

Just like the inequality in the US, the inequality in income across countries is only the symptom of the deeper inequality in opportunity, which is based on an external attribute, which is political alliance during a brief period of time (the last years of the cold war). So although globalization reduced some inequality, such as extreme poverty, it also enlarged inequality in other areas, such as the internal inequality in the US and China. It does not cost the ones in power much to pull some people out of extreme poverty and it also looks nice on them; however, the system is almost as unfair as before.

What can we do

I believe the inequality in opportunity is fundamentally wrong; it will cause stagnation in development in human civilization; and even the ones who are better off now will suffer in the long run. However, we humans are notoriously short sighted; so I don’t think equality can be granted by the privileged from top down. It is up to the underprivileged people to rise up, to demand equal opportunity everywhere, not afraid of putting themselves on the line. The civil right movement in the 1960s was a very good example of this.

On the other hand, the business leaders are not in possession of the power to cure inequality, nor do they have the responsibility of doing so. They can see the inequality as an opportunity for arbitrage, such as outsourcing to countries with cheaper labor, etc. If the market is healthy, the invisible hand should play in favor of reducing inequality. If the market is not healthy, whatever the business leaders can do at the individual level does not matter, or worse.

一种新的宏观调控手段

Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:42:47 +0000

我前一段研究了一阵子宏观经济学。目前由于种种原因，全球经济前景不容乐观. 纯市场手段已经不起作用，宏观调控手段从过去经验上来看，有不小的副作用. 那么，还有什么方法能让经济发展稳定下来，而不是滞胀，或者忽冷忽热呢？我有了一个大胆的想法。

目前的调控手段

目前的调控手段有两个，一个是财政手段，一个是金融政策手段。财政手段掌握在政府手中：政府可以根据社会总需求坚挺或疲软，逆向调节政府采购，从而给社会总需求削峰填谷。金融政策手段掌握在央行手里：央行可以根据经济是否过热或萧条来调节利率以及货币总供给，从而调节资本成本，加强或削弱投资积极性，从而给疲软的经济打强心针，给过热的经济吃退烧药。

财政手段粗看起来没有问题。问题在于，政府采购见效慢，从批复，到找相应的项目投资或减资，到影响到经济层面需要一个不短的过程。另外，政府削减开支阻力重重，谁想自己的部门预算降低呢？增加开支倒是人人乐意，但各国政府已经深陷赤字：美国上年度财政赤字超过 -16%, 日本稍好，只有 -12%，但日本政府总负债已经到了全国GDP的 266% 的骇人程度，再增加开支恐怕几辈子都还不上了。

金融政策见效快。利率动一动，整个市场就跟着动起来了。问题在于，央行降息增加的流动性很难流到真正需要钱的生产领域，大部分被金融机构截流，把各种资产，如股票或房产炒高了，对生产反而无益有害。央行如果想加息则基本没有空间。以日本为例，政府总负债已经到了全国GDP的 266%，加息就是自杀。所以，央行们常常是顾此失彼。以美国联储为例，又要平抑物价，又要增加就业。但平抑物价需要加息，增加就业需要减息。要是通胀和失业都高，就是所谓滞胀情况下，不管加息减息都两面不是人。欧洲央行稍微好点，只需平抑物价，就业是各国自己的事。结果就是欧盟内部失业率从荷兰的 3.3% 到西班牙的 13.65%啥水平都有，几家欢乐几家愁。还有一点不能不考虑，央行归根到底是银行家控制，他们不可避免地和私有领域的银行家有利益纠葛，不能认为是完全公正无私的。所以，央行权力过大不是好事。

宏观经济学上看各种经济指标，不外乎来自供给侧或者需求侧。财政手段明显是一个纯需求侧的调控手段。金融政策调节的是投资，也主要是一个需求侧的调控手段，对供给侧的影响是间接的。那么有没有供给侧的宏观调控手段呢？暂时还没有。

第三只脚

一个凳子至少要有三只脚才会稳。经济运行要调控，但目前只有以上这两种手段，靠政府和央行两个力量相互制约。这注定是一个不稳定的系统。所以，我想建立第三种力量，掌握第三种权力，这样应该能改善目前的不稳定局面。假如把央行手中增加就业的责任拿走，让它只需考虑平抑物价，类似欧洲央行一般，那么它应该可以把这件事做的很好。

问题是就业谁管？

在我的构想里，要成立一个非政府，非金融体系的民间非赢利机构，来负责调控就业。这是一个相当重的责任，所以相应地需要给这个组织有相应的，垄断性的权力才行。以下为行文方便，给这个假想的组织命名为全国总工会。

劳动币

全国总工会使用区块链技术发行一种数字加密货币，可以叫做劳动币。国家用法律规定，所有用工单位，发放工资奖金等劳动报酬，必须以劳动币形式发放。所有雇佣单位和打工人都在同一个区块链上开设劳动币账户，所有的劳动合同都必须以劳动币为单位。劳动币和主权货币自由兑换。

Labourcoin

劳动币是以主权货币百分之百抵押发行的，在链上账户不仅没有利息，还有保管费用。而且，再大的庄家也大不过全国总工会，所以，恶意的投机事件不会存在，劳动币的波动性会很小。频繁的卖高买低会普遍存在，导致劳动币流通迅速，价格透明。

劳动币所有交易在区块链上存底，所有第三方都可以自行验证。打工人的数字钱包代码自己掌握，从而保护个人隐私。个人收入所得税填报以及社会福利账户也可以与此关联，简化手续，降低欺诈风险。

如果失业率过高，则劳动币需求降低。自然而然的劳动币贬值，相当于全国劳动者一起降薪。企业成本降低，利润上升，会更有积极性雇人。反之，假如用工需求过于旺盛，则劳动币升值，相当于全国劳动者一起加薪。企业成本上升，利润降低，会少雇人，从而降低劳动币需求。

全国总工会作为劳动币的庄家，可以在市场上因势利导，调控劳动市场和失业率。对劳动币它可以收取保管费，交易手续费，以及劳动币借贷服务。它收取的费用可以覆盖它的运作以及劳动币区块链的主节点运行费用。

劳动币作为一种宏观调控手段，它的最大好处是直接作用到供给侧，也就是用工单位的成本上。所以，它可以和需求侧的调控手段如财政手段或金融政策手段有效互补。而且，全国总工会作为非政府机构，可以和政府和央行三者一起形成三角权力制约，防止一家独大。

总结

发行劳动币的实际操作恐怕困难重重：难点不在技术上，而在于现在掌握权力的人或者机构是很难愿意分享权力的。所以，以上只是我作为一个经济学业余爱好者的一点天方夜谭式的臆想罢了。

China, the New Norm

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 20:38:55 +0000

Back in the late 1990’s, very few economists believed that within 20 years, China would grow to become the second latest economy in the world. Fast forward to nowadays, many economists believe that in another 20 years, China can overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world. Some policy makers in the United States even expressed that preventing China from overtaking the United States is the most important guiding factor in deciding the policies of the United States. How did China achieve phenomenal growth in the last 40 years? What should we expect from China in the next 20 years?

The rise of China

China was admitted into the WTO in 2001, 6 years after the formation of the multilateral trade organization, after 15 years of negotiations with the WTO, the earlier trade organizations and other countries, and 23 years since the dramatic change of direction (from exporting revolutions to exporting goods) in China’s policy. Riding on the wave of globalization, China quickly became the world’s factory as we know it today: Export tripled in a mere 2 years from 2001 to 2003, and tripled again in 4 years inß 2007. The main driving force behind China’s growth was the global demands of manufactured goods, particularly from the United States. China seized this opportunity not just by luck; the preparation has been 23 years in the making: A market driven economy that created a blooming private sector, an abundant and educated workforce that are willing to work for a very low wage in the western standard, and a better infrastructure compared to other developing countries. So it was China, not anyone else, that hit the jackpot.

After the first few golden years of China in the WTO, the leaders of China realized that there are a few structural problems created by this unprecedented growth: Deteriorating environment, growing social inequality, and above all, the demand from the external, primarily from the developed countries, would slow down someday soon. Evidently, China did not have to wait for long for the slowdown: The sub-prime crisis in the US happened in 2008. So the then prime minister Wen tried to devise some policies to level the income inequality within China and cultivate the internal demand as the second driving horse beside the exports. His policies had mixed successes; in 2010 the export over GDP ratio was lowered from the height of 35% down to 24%, which would be further reduced to 21% in 2014, while China can still attain 6%+ growth in GDP YoY over the period. On the other hand, the Gini index did not improve, and the pollution problem was worsening. Even more alarmingly, the debt level of the local government and the SOE were at all time high, with many debts being essentially unserviceable.

After Xi came into power, the search for new demand to drive growth went outwards again. In his One Belt One Road initiative, China is trying to cultivate demands for Chinese goods and services from the developing world, using state sponsored financial aids and private investment abroad as leverage. Again, I’d call the result of this policy shift a mixed success. On one hand, some demands have been created that fueled the growth of GDP in recent years. On the other hand, demonstrating the influence of China abroad became not just for the ego of Xi himself, but also a necessity. This influence, or “flex of muscle” if you wish, raised concerns from other countries, and put China in a clash course with the current dominant power of the world, the United States.

The conflicts

I do not believe the trade deficit is the main conflict between the US and China. There are at least 2 other conflicts that are even more profound: The tight control of capital flows across the border by the Chinese government, and the iron tight control of information censorship within China. In China’s view, controlling capital flow is a necessary self-defence because she has seen what a sudden outflow of foreign investment has done to some Latin America and Southeast Asia countries. However, the capital control created a deep untrust of the Chinese government, not just from the foreign entities, but also from Chinese firms and nationals themselves: Are my assets safe here?

Censorship is an even bigger problem. From the viewpoint of the Chinese government, there is a deep mistrust of foreign influence, because the legitimacy of the current form of government is very questionable, or at least unpopular. So they have to do everything in their power to “weed out” the dissent. However, from the US point of view, the number one competency of the US is the leadership in information technology, and the resulting dominance in media, both in traditional form and the newer social form. Now that the US firms are denied access to a market they are otherwise very favorable, it is unfair and immoral.

Even discounting the tension with the US and the West, censorship is stiffening innovation in China and is becoming a major detrimental factor for future productivity growth of China. I don’t know what will happen; It is likely that both the US and China will experience a prolonged period of stagnation in the foreseeable future, so their relationship may not matter that much. One thing I know: whatever happened in 2001 will not happen to China again, or to any country for that matter.

U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Sat, 17 Jan 2026 19:37:03 +0000

In 2007, a strange financial crisis happened in the US and soon spreaded to every corner in the world. It is strange because unlike other recessions that happened before, it is not triggered by an event, such as external shocks or sudden policy adjustments. Nevertheless, the resulting economic recession was not any less than others, with a rippling effect that is probably longer than most.

The U.S. Housing market

House prices are constantly rising in major metropolitan areas in the US. The main reason is that people are experiencing unprecedented levels of mobility after World War II. The US, in particular, has attracted a steady infusion of immigrants with human capital from all over the world. There are only so many nice places in the US that are highly appreciated by home buyers, so homes in a good neighborhood are assets in scarcity; and the scarcity can only go up in time.

Since around 2001, after the tech bubble burst and the 9/11 terrorist attack, the US Fed has taken a drastic police reaction to stimulate the economy. The result was the interest rate was at an almost all-time low around 2004. The low mortgage rate further heated up the housing market and something called the subprime mortgage became very popular. A subprime mortgage is usually an ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) that has a very low introductory rate, that enables people who otherwise cannot afford to buy a house to buy one. Homebuyers wanted to take the risk because even if the homes turn out to be unaffordable in the long run, they can sell the houses for a profit then go back to renting. Well, only if home prices keep rising.

The low interest rate was only temporary as a short term policy to pull the economy out from the downturn. Starting from the lowest point in 2004, Fed was steadily raising the interest level back up. Many home buyers discovered that they really cannot afford the houses they got, so starting from 2007, foreclosure rates shot up, which put tremendous pressure on the house prices. Once house prices started falling, many new buyers with subprime mortgages realized that they have a negative asset in their houses so they became even more eager to foreclose their homes. The effect snowballed and by the middle of 2007, some major financial institutions were on the brink of bankruptcy. And this was merely the beginning.

At that time, the Fed still believed that “the housing market weakness did not appear to have spilled over to a significant extent.” Traditionally, the Fed has a line on the ground: inside the line there is commercial banking, which is heavily regulated. Outside the line are the investment bankers, which were not regulated nearly as much and took much more risks willingly for greater returns. The Fed believed that the firewalls on the line are strong enough so even if whatever outside the wall is burning, the inside shall survive largely intact.

The crisis

However, two factors effectively rendered this firewall null. One is the financial innovations such as CDOs that will easily spread credit risks across many financial institutions. The other is globalization, so foreign banks were also intimately connected to the US market and feel the subprime credit crunch just as much as the US banks. Effectively, everyone is on the same boat and if one goes down, so do everyone else.

Fed responded to the crisis in three ways:

Firstly, They used the traditional monetary and fiscal policy adjustments. Fed cut rate quickly, in fact, it was the fastest rate cutting in history. The US government also issued very large fiscal stimulus packages to stabilize the credit market.

Secondly, the Fed is directly involved in bailing out investment banks, such as Bear Steams, and underwrote a significant portion of the affected assets in the acquisition transactions. This was unprecedented in history.

Lastly, they strengthened the regulation on financial institutions in the areas such as information disclosure, liquidity management, and even attempted to regulate the investment banks. They also raised the loan limit of federal housing agencies.

The effects were controversial. We do not have enough information to judge those policies’ success because there was no counterfactual with which to compare. One thing we know for sure is: It was the actions or inactions of the Fed after the 2001 downturn that got us into this mess because there was no external shock to blame.

The aftermath

I am afraid history is repeating itself now:

An large external shock (COVID-19) that triggered a recession
Fed and the US government came up with very large and controversial policy reactions to stimulate the economy
Unregulated financial activities (private equities) at an all-time high
Financial innovations (crypto currencies) whose long term ramifications are unknown

Are we looking at a similar internal triggered recession a few years down the road?

Central Banks and Their Roles

Tue, 30 Dec 2025 09:54:00 +0000

Before the early 20th century, central banks’ responsibilities and thus their powers were rather limited. They were set up to issue currency, purchase government debt and facilitate inter-bank transactions. There were not many monetary policies to make; managing the macro economy was not their responsibility.

How the Fed comes into power

The widely held belief at that time was that the macro economy would correct itself by the force of the market. If the demand were weak, commodity prices would go down and bring back the consumption. If unemployment went up, the price for labor would decline and bring back the employment level. The nominal economy metrics, such as the GDP and the CPI should be uncoupled from the real outputs and consumption of the society as a whole.

However, the great depression in the early 20 century changed the prevailing view. People realized that the nominal economic factors really have a profound effect on the real economy factors. The market may not always be able to correct itself. Part of the reason is price rigidity. For example, if demand were low, firms may lower production instead of lowering price. Also if unemployment were high, people may still not be willing to work for a much lower wage. So if the equilibrium were out of whack due to some large shock to the economy, the market alone cannot recover the economy, at least not in a timely fashion. Some kind of coordinated intervention, such as policy change, is needed.

Thus the central banks, in particular the central bank (the Fed) of the United States took on a much bigger responsibility than before: To correct the market failures in the macro economy using monetary policies.The Fed has several levers, but they all boil down to interest rate manipulation. For example, if the inflation were high and the market cannot correct itself, the Fed will manipulate the interest rate to make it higher, so the firms are less likely to invest, thus bringing down the aggregated demand, and the price in the end. If unemployment were high, the Fed would lower the interest rate so firms have an easier access to capital so they can invest more and hire more people in the process, so unemployment would come down.

The Fed has two mandates, which are: one, controlling inflation, two, controlling the unemployment rate. The power to control the interest rate has great influence on the economy, so to prevent the power from being abused by the government for the agenda of the politicians, the Fed gained autonomy status from the government in the 1950s, so it can focus on it’s mandates without answering to the whim of public opinions or election cycles.

Fed’s dilemma

However, the tool the Fed has, the interest rate, while powerful, is only in a single dimension. On the other hand, the crisis of the economy can be very different in nature and contains many variables; so sometimes the Fed is in a dilemma: On one side they want to lower the interest rate to fight unemployment, while at the same time they need a higher interest rate to combat inflation, such as in the “stagnation” case of the 70’s. We also need to consider that manipulating the interest rate can also have many side effects, some of them not prominent until several years later. For example the sub-prime crisis was largely caused by a prolonged low interest rate period after the recession in the early 2000’s.

There is another important factor we need to consider. The chairman and governors of the Fed are only human; they could make mistakes, or worse, they could have their own agenda to push, their own gains to chase. How do we make sure the Fed will always act in the interest of the whole society? How do we gauge the performance of the Fed, and correct the “correcting acts” of the Fed if something went haywire?

I don’t pretend that I even have the faintest idea for the answers to those questions. I think the Fed alone, with the weapon of adjusting the interest rate, cannot handle the newer generation of recessions. On the other hand, we probably don’t want to empower the Fed even further so they become gods. I see that there are two great powers that affect the economy: the fiscal policy wielded by the government, and the monetary policy wielded by the Fed. I believe there needs to be yet another power, separated from both the government and the Fed, to make the system robust. I don’t know what the power is though.