Coercion is both presumptively wrong and undermines the responsibility of the person coerced. How do these two features of coercion hang together, and what explains why? In this paper, Japa Pallikkathayil offers a rich and original account. She focuses on cases of “volitional” coercion (hereafter, simply coercion)—where one agent tries to alter another person’s choice—rather … Continue reading Japa Pallikkathayil, “The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with C...| Political Not Metaphysical
Is it a defect of a normative political theory that the requirements it recommends are not likely to ever be met? In “Utopophobia”, David Estlund argues that it is not. The mistake that those who think it is a defect make is to confuse a standard of justice with an appropriate practical goal. To begin, … Continue reading David Estlund, Utopophobia→| Political Not Metaphysical
Holly Lawford-Smith’s brief article, “Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini”, is exactly what it sounds like: a concise reply to Laura Valentini’s “On The Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory”. Valentini, as I summarize elsewhere, outlines a paradox consisting of three premises: Any sound theory of justice must be (1) action-guiding and (2) ideal, but (3) any … Continue reading Holly Lawford-Smith, “Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini”→| Political Not Metaphysical
Many critics of ideal theory contend that there is a gap between ideal theories and our non-ideal circumstances—a gap which renders ideal theories ill-suited to guide action in the real world. Valentini calls this the guidance critique. But yet, ideal theory seems inescapable. This, Valentini generates a paradox, which can be stated as follows: Any … Continue reading Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory”→| Political Not Metaphysical
“What are the merits and limitations of ideal and nonideal theory, and what is their property role?” asks Ingrid Robeyns in “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice”. Normative Social Justice Analysis: A Typology To answer that question, she begins by distinguishing “three different layers” of “normative social justice research”. (Note in so doing see sets … Continue reading Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice”→| Political Not Metaphysical
In recent years, political philosophers have started to pay more attention to methodology, largely to due pressure from the charge that political philosophy is too detached to really guide political action Many of theses methodological debates have clustered together under the heading ideal/non-ideal theory. In this article, Laura Valentini argues—I think rightly—that the debate about … Continue reading Laura Valentini, Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map→| Political Not Metaphysical
Anthony Appiah’s recently published book As If: Idealization and Ideals is an insightful and original treatment of the role of idealization in philosophical thought. This has been a hot topic in recent political philosophy. But, part of what makes Appiah’s discussion more interesting than most is that he places his discussion of ‘ideal theory’ within a … Continue reading Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Political Ideals: Lessons from John Rawls” in As If: Idealization and Ideals.→| Political Not Metaphysical
In “Ideal and NonIdeal Theory”, A. John Simmons takes up the familiar distinction Rawlsian distinction, a distinction Simmons thinks has not received enough “sustained attention”. His aim is to “rationally reconstruct” Rawls’s position on the distinction, defend Rawls’s approach against alternatives, and reply to some criticisms of Rawls’s approach. Rawls’s Ideal Theory Rawls divides any … Continue reading A. John Simmons, Ideal and Nonideal Theory→| Political Not Metaphysical
A common view set of views about democracy holds: (1) democracy is the best form of government because it grants citizens equal say in making the law, (2) democratic regimes have a special kind of authority that others lack, and (3) that citizens have a moral duty to obey (some) democratic laws because they are … Continue reading Daniel Viehoff, “Democratic Equality and Political Authority”→| Political Not Metaphysical
Background Democratic decision making has two “very different evaluative aspects” — procedure and outcome. Christiano argues that the two are irreducible. Views that deny this are…| Political Not Metaphysical
