It’s Hard to be Humble, Neil Levy| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
The main thrust of my reflections in “The Contemporary Research University: Freedom and Force” (2024) can be summarized as follows. The epistemological intuition behind the justification for academic autonomy for faculty offered in Hormio and Reijula’s “Universities as Anarchic Knowledge Institutions” (2023) is sound: “as a rule, plurality of thought is more likely to generate new ideas and solutions than cognitive monism” (Rider 2024). In my critical remarks, however, I implici...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Sarah Wright’s essay, “Defending Autonomy as a Criterion for Epistemic Value” (2024), is a defense and suggested elaboration of Catherine Elgin’s work (cf. Elgin 2013). For Elgin, epistemic autonomy should be thought of, on analogy with Kantian autonomy generally, as a value and a constraint on a whole domain of human agency. Epistemic autonomy consists in believing for reasons one can reflectively endorse, and reflective endorsement requires recognizing the legitimacy of those reason...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
In a recent special issue of Social Epistemology (2024, 38:3), a diverse set of authors discuss epistemic autonomy,[1] its place as a virtue, and related uses and abuses of epistemic agency. In this response essay, I will develop a perspective on epistemic autonomy the importance of which is, I think, underlined by these essays taken as a set. The upshot of the essay being this. There is a need for a virtue term that pertains to developing and maintaining a perspective that is epistemically i...| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Critical Replies are engagements with articles recently published in Social Epistemology.| Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective